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Abstract
The causal effect of an intervention (treatment/exposure) on an outcome can be estimated by: i)
specifying knowledge about the data-generating process; ii) assessing under what assumptions a target
quantity, such as for example a causal odds ratio, can be identified given the specified knowledge (and
given the measured data); and then, iii) using appropriate statistical estimation techniques to estimate
the desired parameter of interest. As regression is the cornerstone of statistical analysis, it seems obvious
to ask: is it appropriate to use estimated regression parameters for causal effect estimation? It turns
out that using regression for effect estimation is possible, but typically requires more assumptions than
competing methods. This manuscript provides a comprehensive summary of the assumptions needed
to identify and estimate a causal parameter using regression and, equally important, discusses the
resulting implications for statistical practice.
1 Introduction
Regression is one of the most popular statistical methods in science. The search term “regression” gives
1,164,884 hits on Scopus and 793,309 hits on Web of Science2. Regression models serve many purposes:
they can be used for prediction, describe relationships in the data, be auxiliary tools to facilitate other
estimation techniques, and they can – in principle – also be used to assess the effect of an intervention on
an outcome.
The goals of many scientific questions are causal in nature: does a new social grant policy decrease
unemployment? Will a new drug lead to lower 5-year mortality compared to the currently used drug?
Is the implementation of a new advertisement strategy going to increase future sales? Does the use of a
certain pesticide increase the risk of developing a specific cancer? The list is endless. No matter what
study design: to answer causal questions, researchers often fit a regression model containing the outcome,
the intervention and covariates, and the association between intervention and outcome is reported as
the effect measure of interest. However, as Hernan (2018) highlights: “An association measure from an
observational analysis may be a biased estimate of a causal effect, but being explicit about the goal of
the analysis is a prerequisite for good science. Do we want to estimate the association measure or the
causal effect measure?” [1]. If the goal of a study is causal, and there is knowledge about the data and
the process generating it, one can ask whether regression models can be used to estimate a particular
causal effect or not.
In theory, regression models can identify causal effects, both for randomized studies and observational
data, though the assumptions are particularly strict for the latter. This has been acknowledged in the
literature, but educational articles typically focus on one aspect that may bias effect estimates, but not on
a full set of assumptions. For example, Cole et al. demonstrate that the inclusion of variables which are
caused by both the outcome and intervention (colliders) can cause bias [2]; Petersen et al. evaluate the
impact of positivity violations, i.e. that the probability of treatment assignment is (close to) zero in certain
covariate strata [3]; and Hernan et al. point out the possible bias of per-protocol and intention-to-treat
analyses in randomized trials [4].
While the limitations of regression modeling for causal effect estimation are well-known, a compre-
hensive summary of relevant assumptions is missing in the literature so far. This manuscript should
hopefully fill this gap and provide useful discussions on various aspects of regression analysis, including
(causal) interpretation of regression coefficients, considerations for model selection and appropriate setups
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for Monte-Carlo simulations. The manuscript is structured in two parts: the first part (Sections 2 and 3)
reviews the assumptions needed to identify and estimate causal parameters with regression models. This
review is based on a large set of assumptions, all of which are discussed in the literature; but this set
is later distilled into a smaller set given the overlap of many of assumptions. The second part (Section
4-7) reflects on the practical implications for regression analyses: given the set of assumptions, what are
the implications for different study designs, how does it affect interpretations, what are the consequences
when designing simulation setups, and how should variables be selected?
2 Framework
2.1 Notation
Let Y denote the vector of outcomes, A an intervention of interest, L = {L1, . . . , Lp} a set of measured
covariates, and U = {U1, . . . , U q} a set of unmeasured covariates. Using a counterfactual framework,
one can think of potential outcomes Y A=ai = Y
a
i as the outcome that would have been observed for
individual i under the intervention A = a, possibly contrary to the fact. If A is binary, each unit has
two potential outcome, Y 1i and Y
0
i , and only one of them can be observed. Similarly, L
j,a
i would denote
the counterfactual covariate Lj for observation i under A = a. For simplicity, longitudinal data is not
considered in this paper. Notation regarding censoring and missing data is introduced further below.
2.2 Target Parameter
If A is binary, a common estimand of interest would be the average treatment effect (ATE):
ATE = E(Y 1)− E(Y 0) . (1)
The ATE compares the expected value of Y if every unit had received A = 1 compared to if every unit
had received A = 0. For a binary outcome one can, for example, look at the marginal (causal) odds ratio:
MOR =
P (Y 1 = 1)
1− P (Y 1 = 1)/
P (Y 0 = 1)
1− P (Y 0 = 1) . (2)
More generally, for example when A is continuous, one could specify a marginal structural working model
(MSM) which describes the relationship between the intervention and the counterfactual outcome. For
example,
E(Y a) = β0 + β1A (3)
is a working MSM. Now, let FP denote the distribution of P = {L, (Y a : a ∈ A)} where A denotes the
possible values A can take; then a more general MSM, possibly conditional on one (or more) covariate(s)
L∗, can be written as
EFP (Y
a|L∗) = m(a,L∗|β) . (4)
The functional form of the MSM will typically not be known. One may assume that the functional form in
(4) is correct, and if this is true then β describes the true causal relationship between A and Y ; however,
it is more likely that such a “working” model is incorrect in which case β is defined as the projection of
the true causal estimand EFP (Y
a|L∗) onto the specified model. This subtlety is however not the focus of
this manuscript. The point is: no matter how a causal target quantity is defined, one can assess whether
regression can, in principle, be used to estimate this quantity (if it is identified). In the below examples
we focus on the ATE and MOR, but the arguments made hold for a wider class of target parameters.
Causal target quantities can be marginal or conditional with respect to L. Equations (1) and (2)
describe marginal estimands; equation (4) a conditional estimand. Another simple conditional estimand
is E(Y 1|L∗) where L∗ describes a particular covariate. The most meaningful causal estimands are either
marginal, or conditional on very few strata; for example conditional on one or two covariates. For
instance, if one is interested in the effect of a new drug (compared to an old drug) on 5-year mortality,
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then a marginal target quantity such as the ATE is most meaningful. The drug may however work
differently is certain groups, such as pregnant women or people with concomitant medication. In such
cases, estimates conditional on certain covariate strata can be meaningful. However, it would not make
sense to then stratify such a causal estimand further; for example by conditioning on age, region of birth,
marital status and so on. Ultimately, a causal estimand will in most cases be marginal with respect to at
least a subset of L. This is a very important point which becomes much clearer below.
2.3 Identification using Regression Models
Target quantities, as described in the section above, are of interest whenever one is interested in the
causal effect of A on Y . Note that these quantities are typically marginal with respect to L and U, or
at least a subset thereof. In contrast, regression models provide estimates for conditional expectations.
For instance, a linear regression model may estimate E(Y |A,L). This is an expression that refers to a
conditional expectation of the observed outcome, rather than the counterfactual one. The question posed
in this paper is, in principal: under which assumptions is
E(Y a)
?
= E(Y |A = a,L) (5)
In terms of the ATE we could ask: when is
E(Y 1)− E(Y 0) ?= E(Y |A = 1,L)− E(Y |A = 0,L) (6)
which relates to estimating β1 in a regression model of the form E(Y |A,L) = β0+β1A+β2L. Similarly,
we could ask: when is the marginal causal odds ratio equivalent to the conditional odds ratio provided
by logistic regression? Of course, such identification problems relate to any regression model, no matter
whether more general model classes are considered or not; any generalized linear model, or any model that
models relationships non-linearly, say with splines, is still a regression model that estimates a conditional
expectation for an observed outcome. Section 3 delves deeper into the question of identification.
2.4 Structural/Causal Model
Whether identification, as outlined in (5), is possible depends not only on the chosen statistical estimation
technique, but also on the data generating process and the measured data. Causal effect estimation can
not be done without a structural model that summarizes subject matter knowledge. One way to express
this knowledge is by using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). In a DAG, each circle represents a variable
– and an arrow from A to B (A → B) means that we assume that A causes B. Equally important, the
absence of an arrow means we assume no causal relationship between the two respective variables. DAGs
may contain both measured and unmeasured variables, see Figure 1 for some simple examples. Every
aspect that is known or assumed to describe the data-generating process should be contained in the DAG.
L A Y
(a)
A Y L
(b)
L1 L2 U
A Y
(c)
Figure 1: Examples of different directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)
There are other ways to express knowledge, such as using structural equations, but it is not necessarily
needed to embark upon these approaches in more detail to explain the assumptions below. Given the
structural model, the chosen target quantity and the observed data, it can be assessed whether it is
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possible to translate the causal question into a statistical estimand [5]. If the answer is yes, an appropriate
estimator can be chosen. We now assume that the estimation technique of interest is a regression model
and ask under which assumptions this model can link the observed data to the causal target quantity.
3 List of Assumptions
The below sections 3.1 to 3.12 summarize assumptions which are often cited to be needed to identify
and estimate a causal target parameter using regression coefficients. Not all of these assumptions are
necessary assumptions [6] in the sense that in some settings they may be relaxed, or that they may even be
seen as a theorem rather than an assumption [7]. Moreover, many of the listed assumptions overlap, and
relate to similar issues; but they are nevertheless useful when practically evaluating the appropriateness
of regression analysis to make causal claims. Section 3.13 distills the list of assumptions into a smaller
set and provides a formal evaluation of this reduced set. In summary, the provided list is meant to be
both a comprehensive and useful guide for a given research question and analysis.
3.1 Assumption 1: No unmeasured confounders
The assumption of no unmeasured confounding is related to concepts of conditional exchangeability,
unconfoundedness, d-seperation of Y and A, closing back-door paths, randomisation assumptions, no
omitted variables, ignorability of treatment assignment, selection on observables, among others. As a
starting point, consider conditional exchangeability, which requires the counterfactual outcome for those
treated to be the same as for those untreated if untreated subjects had received, possibly contrary to
the fact, the treatment of the treated and therefore, the two groups are exchangeable (conditional on
the covariate strata). Or, in other words, no matter whether the subset of those actually treated or the
group of those untreated are selected, counterfactual outcomes would be the same for a given intervention
A = a. More formally, conditional exchangeability can be expressed as
Y a
∐
A|L for ∀A = a,L = l . (7)
For a binary outcome and binary intervention this equates to P (Y a = 1|A = 1,L = l) = P (Y a = 1|A =
0,L = l). To understand when this assumption is met, and how it relates to unmeasured variables, the
best is to evaluate the graphical counterpart of the conditional exchangeability definition.
In a DAG, a back-door path is defined as path from A to Y that starts with an arrow into A. Consider
Figure 1a: here A ← L → Y is a back-door path. A back-door path generates confounding for the
effect of A on Y , and L is the confounder. A back-door path can be blocked, and confounding removed,
by conditioning on the confounder3, for example by using regression [8]. Conditional exchangeability is
the same as being able to block all back-door paths [9]. Thus, conditional exchangeability is met if all
back-door paths can be blocked by adding the respective confounders as covariates into the regression
model.
Now, if the confounder is measured, as in the example in Figure 2a, then regression can deal with it.
It is obvious that an unmeasured confounder, as in Figure 2b, can not be taken into account by regression
analyses; thus, there remain open back-door paths and conditional exchangeability is not achieved. In a
randomized experiment, treatment assignment is random and does not depend on covariates, see Figure
2c for an example. The lack of an arrow from L to A indicates this knowledge and implies that L is not
a confounder. Thus, the assumption of no unmeasured confounders is achieved by design4. In this case,
it will not necessarily hurt to add L to the regression model5, but omitting it is not wrong either.
In summary, the postulated structural model helps with identifying open back-door paths and relevant
confounders. If these confounders are measured, regression adjustment is possible.
3and by not conditioning on any collider or (descendant of a) mediator, see Sections 3.3 and 3.4
4see Section 4 for details
5unless one is interested in non-collapsible effect measures, see Section 3.9
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region (L) storks (A) births (Y)
(a) measured confounder
SES (U) alcohol (A) stroke (Y)
(b) unmeasured confounder; SES = socio-economic status
age (L) drug (A) mortality (Y)
(c) no confounding; randomization
Figure 2: Examples for confounding
3.2 Assumption 2: Correct model specification
Another assumption that is required to make regression a legitimate tool for effect estimation is correct
model specification, at least for observational data6. While the causal inference literature often promi-
nently cites this assumption, it isn’t explained very often. A simple motivation is given in Figure 3. Here,
both L and L2 act as a confounder because they both affect treatment assignment and the outcome.
If this is true, then there exists the back-door path A ← L2 → Y . Omitting L2 from the regression
equation will thus leave a back-door path open, confounding is going to persist, and the arguments made
with respect to assumption 1 apply. Note that DAGs are typically completely non-parametric7 and don’t
contain parametric assumptions encoded in variables such as L2; Figure 3 is more restrictive for the sole
purpose to motivate for the need to correctly specify a regression model in causal analyses.
A Y
L L2
Figure 3: A graphical representation of non-linear relationships
It is important to note that the above argument concerning model mis-specification only applies to
non-saturated models. A saturated model is one in which the number of parameters in the model is equal
to the number of population quantities that can be estimated by using the model. For example, consider
the situation in which there is only one binary confounder L, as well as a binary treatment and binary
outcome. A regression model P (Y = 1|A = a, L = l) = β0 + β1A + β2L + β3AL contains 4 parameters,
and it estimates 4 quantities: P (Y = 1|A = 0, L = 0), P (Y = 1|A = 1, L = 0), P (Y = 1|A = 0, L = 1),
P (Y = 1|A = 1, L = 1); thus, the model is saturated and imposes no modeling restrictions. There is no
need to worry about model mis-specification here. However, as soon as L is continuous and takes on many
possible values, the model becomes non-saturated. In this case, correct model specification is crucial for
effect estimation.
3.3 Assumption 3: No conditioning on a collider
As highlighted under assumption 1, any back-door path between A and Y needs to be blocked to identify
the desired target quantity. Conditioning on a confounder blocks a path, but conditioning on a so-called
6in randomized trials several standard regression-based hypothesis tests (which use robust variance estimators) are guar-
anteed to have correct Type I error for large samples, even when the models are incorrectly specified, see Rosenblum and
van der Laan for details [10]
7A DAG may relate to a set of structural equations which which is an alternative way to encode structural assumptions
and a possible way to define counterfactuals, see for example Pearl (2009)[11]
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collider opens a path. A variable is a collider on a given path if the path enters and leaves the respective
variable via arrowheads. In Figure 4a, L is a collider. No adjustment is needed, the path A→ L← Y is
blocked. Conditioning on L, for example via regression, opens the path and introduces association where
there was none before. This situation is illustrated in Figure 4b where the rectangle means ‘conditioning
on’.
A Y L
(a) no association of A and Y , the
path A→ L← Y is blocked
A Y L
(b) conditioning on collider L; →
opens path and creates association
L A C
Y
U
(c) selection bias by conditioning
on a collider
A
L1
L2 Y
U
(d) somking-preeclampsia paradox
Figure 4: Examples for colliders
The bias introduced by conditioning on a common effect of treatment and outcome is not only known
as collider bias, but sometimes also as selection bias. Consider Figure 4c in which A refers to a meal
containing wasabi, C an indicator whether a respondent agreed to take part in the survey, L the stress
level, U an unmeasured heart disease and Y mortality 1 year after the survey. Conditioning on C is
another expression for saying that the data may be analyzed on the complete cases only, i.e. restricting
the analysis to those respondents who agreed to take part in the survey. It may not be surprising to find
out that those who disagreed may not be representative of all people approached, and therefore there is
selection bias. In this (hypothetical) example conditioning on C opens the path A → C ← L ← U → Y
and introduces selection bias in the sense that those included in the study have a lower stress level and may
therefore be less likely to die during the following year. If the unmeasured heart disease was measured,
the path could be blocked again and collider bias would not occur.
Of course, Figure 4c is an over-simplified example omitting many important variables. A somewhat
more realistic example is represented in Figure 4d. Here, A refers to the amount of smoking, Y refers
to pre-eclampsia diagnosed at birth (a common birth complication), L1 represents the BMI and age of
the mother as well as the number of prior births, L2 is the gestation week at delivery and U is the
placental pathology. Multiple epidemiological studies using a regression model containing L1, L2, and L3
as covariates have concluded that higher smoking is associated with a lower risk of pre-eclampsia. This
nonintuitive finding can be explained by collider bias8 as conditioning on L2 opens the path A ← L1 →
L2 ← U → Y , see Luque-Fernandez et al. (2016) for details [12].
Other popular examples of collider biases are the obesity paradox [13], the birthweight paradox [14],
the sodium intake paradox [15], and survival bias [16], among others.
In summary, regression models should not contain colliders which open a back-door path from A to
Y .
3.4 Assumption 4: No conditioning on a mediator (and its descendants)
A mediator is a variable M which lies on the path between A and L, i.e. A → M → Y as in Figure
5a. Conditioning on a mediator blocks the path which relates to the indirect effect of A on Y through
8it is also partly due to bias because of conditioning on a mediator, see Section 3.4
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M , and thus introduces bias with respect to the total9 effect of A on Y . This follows directly from both
Pearl’s back-door criterion [11] and his d-separation concept10. The back-door criterion states that a set
S is sufficient for adjustment if i) the elements of S block all back-door paths, as explained in Section 3.1,
and ii) S does not contain a descendant of A.
A M Y
(a) Conditioning on the mediator
blocks the path A → M → Y and
introduces bias with respect to the
total effect of A on Y
A L Y
U
(b) Conditioning on L, a post-
treatment variable, is fine here
A M Y
L
(c) Conditioning on a descendent of
a mediator is problematic
A M Y
L
(d) Conditioning on L is possible
Figure 5: Examples for the role of mediators
In Figures 5a and 5c, conditioning on M and L respectively would thus introduce bias, whereas
conditioning on L in Figure 5d does not cause any problems [17]. It has been argued that, as a practical
rule of thumb, one should simply not condition on post-treatment variables to avoid the problem of
conditioning on mediators [18]. However, as pointed out by others, this recommendation is not generally
valid [9]. A simple example is given in Figure 5b where conditioning on the post-treatment variable L
does not close any mediating path, but helps to block the back-door path A← U → L→ Y .
In summary, regression models should not contain mediators, or any of the mediator’s descendants
(for analyses where the total effect of A on Y is of interest).
3.5 Assumption 5: Positivity
The assumption of positivity says that the probability of treatment assignment is greater than zero in all
confounder strata, i.e.
P (A = a|L = l) > 0 for ∀l with P (L = l) 6= 0.
In a randomized study this assumption is typically fulfilled because treatment assignment is probabilistic,
0 < P (Ai = 1) < 1, and confounders are not present by design (assumption 1); see Section 4 for more
details. In other studies the assumption of positivity could be violated for two reasons:
i) it may not be possible to receive A = a in L = l by definition, or
ii) P (A = a|L = l) may be zero, or close to zero, in a finite sample.
For example, in Figure 2a the probability to find > 1 storks in a particular region L = l may be zero,
simply because there live no storks in this region. It would however be more commonly the case that the
positivity assumption is practically violated. In settings where there are multiple continuous confounders
it is likely that the assumption is violated, at least to some degree.
9sometimes only the direct effect A→ Y or only the indirect effect A→M → Y are of interest to a researcher; however,
in the context of this paper, only total effects –estimated via regression models– are considered.
10the latter is explained in Section 3.13
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Diagnosing and responding to practical positivity violations is a topic that is heavily under-researched.
In simple settings, where there is a limited set of discrete confounders and a binary treatment, one could
simply produce several tables that tabulate the treatment against the different confounder strata, see
Westreich and Cole (2010) [19] and the references therein for some examples. However, in realistic settings
with many confounders, possibly some of them being continuous, this approach becomes unfeasible.
Alternatively, if the treatment is binary, one could estimate the propensity scores P (A = 1|L = l) and
P (A = 0|L = l) in the data and evaluate the estimated probabilities [20]; if they are small, say < 0.01,
then this is likely indicating positivity violations. Unfortunately this approach won’t work for a continuous
A, and if certain covariate combinations are not present in the data practical positivity violations may
remain uncovered. There are also other options, like using the parametric bootstrap [3], but practical
positivity violations are likely going to occur in many data sets of moderate to small size with multiple
confounders.
Addressing positivity violations can be challenging, but it is good to know that the positivity assump-
tion can often be relaxed if the modeling approach is flexible; that is, if there are sparse regions of the
data, i.e. covariate regions for which P (A = a|L = l) ≈ 0, then the model may be able to extrapolate to
these regions if its complexity is sufficient. It is difficult to say how complex a regression model should
be, but semi-parametric approaches using (penalized) splines may be a good start [21]. Nevertheless,
moderate positivity violations can be best addressed by using approaches other than regression [3], such
as using the g-formula [22] or double robust approaches [16, 23]. If positivity violations are severe not
much can be done and changing the question of interest, or the target population, are the only alternatives
[3].
In summary, positivity violations often occur in practice. If the data do not come from randomized
studies, flexible modeling strategies, and estimation approaches other than regression, are the best ways
to respond to moderate positivity violations, though further research on this topic is needed.
3.6 Assumption 6: Consistency
The assumption or theorem of consistency is formally defined as
IfA = a, thenY a = Y for∀a . (8)
If A is binary, then this is equivalent to Yi = AiY
1
i + (1 − Ai)Y 0i for each observation i, i = 1, . . . , n.
It seems trivial to require Y to be Y a if A = a, but if the intervention A = a is not well-defined, then
the link between actual treatment and counterfactual outcome may not be clear. For example, suppose
the intervention of interest is “single parent”; then, it is not clear what single parent means. It could be
someone taking care of a child on his/her own for 1 month, or for a period of 18 years, by turns with a
former partner, or with support from a grandmother. In each case the potential outcome Y a, let’s say
final graduation mark at age 18, may be different; and therefore the effect of A = a on the outcome may be
different for different versions of the treatment. Any intervention that can be interpreted and implemented
in different ways is potentially prone to bias arising from violation of the consistency assumption.
An alternative view of this issue is that the knowledge of different treatment versions should already be
captured in the DAG: then both the intervention and the target quantity could be defined more precisely.
In this case the consistency assumption would be more of a theorem [7].
Another scenario where the consistency assumption is violated is when observational units can influ-
ence each other, i.e. when Y ai depends on Aj . This is immediately clear from the consistency definition
for binary treatments. An example would be the effect of vaccinations in small geographical areas, where
the experience with treatment A = a of person j could influence the outcome Y a, such as a pain score, of
person i; or if the effect of different pesticides is compared among neighbouring fields that are not fully
separated in terms of pesticide use.
Randomized trials are less prone to violations of the consistency assumption because the trial’s protocol
should be clear about the exact implementation of the intervention. In observational studies it is important
to unambiguously define the intervention of interest. More examples around the interpretation of the
consistency assumption and its practical relevance are given in the literature [24, 25, 26].
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3.7 Assumption 7: No interference
Often “no interference” or the “stable-unit-treatment-value assumption” (SUTVA) is stated as an ad-
ditional assumption to identify a causal target quantity. Rubin (1986) [27] states11 “SUTVA is the
assumption that the value of Y for unit i when exposed to treatment a will be the same no matter what
mechanism is used to assign treatment a to unit i and no matter what treatments the other units receive,
and this holds for i = 1, . . . , n and ∀a ∈ A. SUTVA is violated when, for example, there exist unrepre-
sented versions of treatment (Y ai depends on which version of treatment a was received) or interference
between units (Y ai depends on whether unit j received treatment a or a
′)”. While the definitions of
consistency and SUTVA are technically not identical, they very much imply the same things, namely
problems in identification of the causal target quantity if there exist multiple versions of treatment or
if there is the possibility that observational units influence each other. In that respect consistency and
SUTVA can be seen as very similar assumptions, with similar implications.
3.8 Assumption 8: No relevant effect modification
As opposed to other estimation techniques, regression typically requires the effect to be constant across
the confounder strata, i.e. regression can identify many causal effects only under the assumption of no
relevant effect modification. To understand why effect modification is such a crucial point, it is good to
understand first that based on conditional exchangeability (assumption 1) and consistency and SUTVA
(assumptions 5 and 6) we can write the following in the case of a single confounder L:
E(Y a|L = l) A1= E(Y a|A = a, L = l)
A5,A6
= E(Y |A = a, L = l)
A linear regression model estimating E(Y |A,L) would be E(Y |A,L) = β0 + β1A + β2AL + β3L. For
A = 1 and A = 0 this yields
E(Y |A = 1, L = l) = β0 + β1 + β2l + β3l ,
E(Y |A = 0, L = l) = β0 + β3l .
Now suppose the ATE is the target quantity of interest. Using assumptions 1, 5 and 6 as above we can
write
E(Y 1 − Y 0|L = l) A1,A5,A6= E(Y |A = 1, L = l)− E(Y |A = 0, L = l)
= β0 + β1 + β2l + β3l − β0 − β3l
= β1 + β2l
This implies that only for constant effects, i.e. when β2 = 0, the ATE [that is, E(Y
1 − Y 0)] can be
estimated using β1. If the effect is not constant, i.e. β2 6= 0, then no marginal causal effect will be
estimated but a conditional causal effect. Certainly, as indicated in equation (4), conditional effects may
sometimes be of interest; however, then the assumption that this conditional effect is constant across the
remaining confounder levels (if L is matrix with ≥ 2 columns), still needs to hold. Adding interaction
terms to regression models addresses effect modification but typically changes the target quantity from
marginal quantities to conditional quantities. As highlighted in Section 2.2, most meaningful estimands
are marginal with respect to at least a subset of L. Competing methods [9] marginalize over the confounder
distribution and don’t require effects to be constant.
In summary, if effect modification is present, neglecting this in the regression model will introduce
bias of causal estimands that are marginal with respect to (a subset of) L, but addressing the problem
by adding interaction terms changes the target quantity from a marginal to a conditional quantity.
11the notation is changed to match the notation of this paper
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3.9 Assumption 9: Collapsibility
Another assumption which is needed when using regression to estimate target quantities which are
marginal with respect to at least a subset of L, is that the target quantity chosen is collapsible. For
illustration, consider 3 discrete variables Y,A,L, which are summarized in a I × J × K table. Strict
collapsibility of a measure of association of A and Y means that this measure is constant across the strata
of L and that these conditional measures are equal to the marginal measure. Table 1, from Greenland et
al (1999) [28], shows a simple example for 3 binary variables.
Table 1: Examples of collapsibility and non-collapsibility from Greenland et al (1999) [28]
L=1 L=0 Marginal
A=1 A=0 A=1 A=0 A=1 A=0
Y=1 0.2 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.20
Y=0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.30
Riska 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.40
Risk difference 0.2 0.2 0.2
Risk ratio 1.33 2.00 1.50
Odds ratio 2.67 2.67 2.25
a defined as probability of Y=1
If the relationship between A and Y are measured by means of the risk difference, i.e. the differences
in the probabilities P (Y = 1|A), then the conditional and marginal estimates are identical. The risk
difference is therefore a measure of association that is strictly collapsible. The risk ratio is however
not strictly collapsible because conditional estimates are not constant across the strata of L. However,
while the risk ratio is not strictly collapsible, it is collapsible. A measure of association (or causal effect
measure) is said to be collapsible if the marginal effect measure is equal to a weighted average of the
stratum-specific associations (or causal effect measures) [29]. The marginal risk ratio lies in this case
between the maximum and minimum conditional risk ratio [9]. The odds ratio is known to be neither
collapsible nor strictly collapsible.
It is not immediately evident which measures are (strictly) collapsible and if yes under what assump-
tions, particularly in the context of regression coefficients: here, collapsibility (for a generalized linear
model) means that β1 = β
∗
1 for g(E(Y |A,L)) = β0 + β1A and g(E(Y |A,L)) = β0 + β∗1A + β∗2L (and
thus the model adjusted for L can be used for marginal effect estimation). For example, the conditional
odds ratios from logistic regression will typically not be identical to the marginal odds ratios as defined
in (2), and marginal effect estimation with logistic regression is therefore not recommended. In fact, it
is possible that the coefficient associated with the respective conditional odds ratio has a different sign
than the marginal odds ratio. This difference is also sometimes being referred to as Simpson’s paradox
[30]. The adjusted risk ratio obtained from Poisson regression is however collapsible [31]. It follows that
for binary outcomes, the risk ratio obtained from Poisson regression is often a better choice than the
odds ratio obtained from logistic regression for most questions where the target quantity is marginal with
respect to L. In time-to-event analyses, the Cox proportional hazards model produces coefficients that
are not collapsible, whereas the Aalen hazards model produces collapsible estimates [32, 33].
The above discussions make it clear that coefficients from regression models which are adjusted for L
and are non-collapsible often can’t be used to estimate many relevant (marginal) target quantities. This
statement holds even when the covariates L are only related to the outcome, and not the intervention,
and are thus no confounders [33].
The conclusion is that non-collapsibility of an effect measure does not strictly mean that causal
inference is impossible at all; but, similar to assumption 7, it is evident that the use of regression models
will then provide effect estimates conditional on many covariates, which is most often not useful [34]. If
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the purpose of the analysis is obtaining some sort of marginal effect, then the choice of an inappropriate
regression model (in terms of collapsibility) prohibits effect estimation.
3.10 Assumption 10: Compliance
Non-compliance with treatment assignment is, opposed to the previous assumptions, mostly relevant
in randomized studies with human subjects12. Here, treatment is assigned randomly to A˜ = a˜, but
the treatment actually taken by study participants (A = a) may differ from the assigned treatment.
This situation is called non-adherence or non-compliance and is visualized in Figure 6. It is evident
that randomization is lost under non-compliance because other factors (U) may now affect treatment
assignment, and also the outcome, and therefore confounding can occur. For example, patients may
decide not to take a specific drug because they are not aware of the negative consequences involved;
socio-economic factors determining this behaviour may also affect the outcome, such as a particular
morbidity, and therefore adjustment for these factors would be required.
A˜ A Y
U
Figure 6: A simple situation of non-compliance
Regression models, with covariate adjustment, are often used in randomized trials to take into account
sampling uncertainty and to reduce variability in the effect estimates. While often simple tests would be
sufficient in an idealized trial, using regression models is not necessarily wrong13. In fact, even under model
mis-specification (as discussed under assumption 2) many commonly used regression models provide an
asymptotically correct Type I error, at least under an i.i.d. assumption, robust variance estimation and
for the most commonly employed regression models [10]. However, under non-compliance these results
won’t hold.
If a causal quantity can be estimated under non-compliance depends on the quantity itself as well as
the estimation technique.
i) suppose the ATE is of interest, i.e. E(Y 1)− E(Y 0). Here, the treatment’s efficacy is what matters:
what is the effect of A on Y ? If U in the DAG in Figure 6 is unmeasured, or if there exist other complex
relationships that open a back-door path from A to Y , then the treatment effect is not identified by
fitting a regression model. Other approaches that evaluate the counterfactual intervention A˜ = A =
a14, like the g-formula [35], are needed here.
ii) Given the difficulty to estimate the treatment’s efficacy, it is common to evaluate the treatment’s
clinical effectiveness instead. This would be the effect of A˜ = a˜ on Y and is called “intention-to-
treat” (ITT) effect (which can be estimated from the data15, see also Table 2). It is obvious that
A˜ = a˜ is randomized and thus a test (or regression) can be used to estimate its (causal) effect on Y .
It follows that for this estimand the use of regression is generally valid. The ITT approach may be
useful in placebo-controlled trials, because the ITT effect can be seen as a conservative estimate of
the true treatment effect (of A), i.e. one that is biased towards the null; but in many other settings,
for example where one wants to prove a treatment’s harmful effect, this is not useful because an
analysis that is biased towards the null may fail to establish the harmful nature of an effect [4].
12it is also possible that non-compliance with treatment assignment occurs in observational studies. This is often called
‘measurement error’, see also assumption 12.
13see the discussion on collapsibility though (Section 3.9): the use of regression may change the target quantity if the effect
measure is not collapsible.
14under the assumption that both A and A˜ are measured
15an estimand similar to the ITT estimand can be estimated using instrumental variable estimation, see Hernan and Robins
[9] for details, as well as assumptions involved.
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iii) other estimands under non-adherence are the per-protocol, as treated and complier average causal
effect (CACE), see Table 2. The as-treated effect estimates the difference in expectation of Y for
those actually taking treatment (A = 1) and those not (A = 0). As indicated above, since A is
not randomized the as treated effect won’t estimate the ATE unless other strict assumptions (i.e.
assumptions 1-8) are met. The per-protocol effect looks at the subset of those subjects that adhered to
the assigned treatment. This subset may be subject to selection bias, and may not be representative of
the study population, unless selection into the study (C = 1, i.e. A = A˜ = 1) is completely ignorable,
i.e. P (C = 1|Y,L, U, ξ) = P (C = 1|ξ), or ignorable (P (C = 1|Y,L, U, ξ) = P (C = 1|Y,L, ξ)) and
being accounted for; see assumption 11 for more details. The CACE, which measures the treatment
effect among those who comply with their assigned treatment, is always greater than the ITT and
is an alternative valid causal effect measure. The CACE can identify the ATE when the ATE is the
same for compliers and non-compliers, if they had in fact complied [36].
Table 2: Estimands that are commonly looked at under non-compliance for a binary intervention
effect often estimated using
intention-to-treat (ITT) P (Y = 1|A˜ = 1)− P (Y = 1|A˜ = 0)
as treated P (Y = 1|A = 1)− P (Y = 1|A = 0)
per protocol P (Y = 1|A = 1, A˜ = 1)− P (Y = 1|A = 0, A˜ = 0)
CACE [P (Y = 1|A˜ = 1)− P (Y = 1|A˜ = 0)]/P (A = 1|A˜ = 1)
In summary, using regression under non-adherence will typically yield biased effect estimates with
respect to the ATE and other common marginal effect measures. An alternative is re-defining the estimand
as the ITT or CACE, though this redefines the question of interest and may not be advisable in studies
that are designed to quantify harmful effects or in non-inferiority studies [4].
3.11 Assumption 11: the missing data mechanism
If missing data causes bias with respect to the (causal) target quantity ultimately depends on the the
mechanism that gives rise to the missing data and the target quantity itself.
Traditionally, definitions such as missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR),
and missing not at random (MNAR) have been used to determine if the missingness mechanism can
be ignored or methodologically addressed. Let D = {L, A, Y } denote the stacked data vector of length
(p + 2) × n and C a vector of the same size with Ci = 1 if Di is observed and Ci = 0 otherwise. The
vector C partitions D into the two subsets of observed and unobserved data: Dobs with obs = {i : ci = 1}
and Dmis with mis = {i : ci = 0}. A common definition16 [37, 40] of the above mentioned missingness
concepts are:
MCAR: P (C = c|Dobs = dobs, Dmis = dmis; ξ) = P (C = c|ξ) ∀ξ, c, dobs, dmis ,
MAR: P (C = c|Dobs = dobs, Dmis = dmis; ξ) = P (C = c|Dobs = dobs; ξ) ∀ξ, c, dobs, dmis ,
MNAR: P (C = c|Dobs = dobs, Dmis = dmis; ξ) 6= P (C = c|Dobs = dobs, Dmis = dmis∗ ; ξ)
for some ξ, c, dobs and dmis 6= dmis∗ .
MCAR means that the probability of missingness depends on no observed and no unobserved quan-
tities, and is therefore completely random. MAR allows missingness to depend on measured data and
MNAR means that missingness may even relate to the unobserved data as well.
16the given definitions are sometimes also called “always” [37] or “everywhere” [38] MCAR, MAR and MNAR. In some
cases, weaker conditions that refer to a specific realized sample have been proposed; see Doretti et al. [39] for an overview.
A stronger, graphical definition of MAR is explained below.
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A classical result related to these concepts is that if one is using the complete cases (CC) only, i.e.
those observations for which Ci = 1, consistent estimates remain consistent if the missingness mechanism
is MCAR. Under MAR, consistent estimates will typically not remain consistent using CC (though they
often can be corrected17); but exceptions exist, for example when the probability of a value to be missing
in the covariate L does not depend on the outcome Y , and (non-causal) regression parameters are of
interest [41, 42]. Under MNAR it is more difficult to establish general conclusions, but it is accepted
that most often consistent estimates won’t remain consistent when using the complete cases only, again
under exceptions – such as when covariates in a regression model are missing only based on their own
unobserved values. Thus, a common practice is to omit missing data under MCAR, use methodological
solutions (such as multiple imputation) under MAR and acknowledge limitations under MNAR, possibly
accompanied by sensitivity analyses or particular models that make use of substantive assumptions about
the missingness process [43].
Many authors have described the shortcomings of the above definitions: first, if multiple variables
have missing values simultaneously, it is difficult to practically assess the plausibility of the MAR, MCAR,
and MNAR assumptions [39]. Second, whether a desired target parameter can be estimated, using the
complete cases or differently, can not necessarily be determined with the M(N)AR framework alone [44].
Lastly, it cannot be tested whether MAR, as defined above, holds in a given data set [45]. To overcome
these problems, an alternative graph-based framework has been proposed by Mohan and Pearl [45] because
“ ‘the reasons for missingness’ [...] is a causal, not a statistical concept”:
i) Transparency. This refers to the transparent classification of the missingness mechanism. The
following steps are required:
Step 1: Draw a canonical missingness DAG (m-DAG) which is a DAG that includes all missingness
indicator variables C = {C1, C2, . . .}. The m-DAG describes the assumptions about the data-
generating process and the assumed causes of missingness.
Step 2: Determine the conditional independencies implied by the m-DAG using graphical criteria (i.e.
d-separation, see Section 3.13 for details).
Step 3: Define the graphical missingness mechanism. Let L = {L1,L2} where L1 contains the fully
observed variables and L2 those that are partially observed and contain missing data. Data
(L, A, Y,C, U = ∅) are said to be G-MCAR if L, A, Y ∐C. G-MAR is fulfilled if the condition
L1, A, Y
∐
C|L2 is met. The data are defined to be G-MNAR if they are not G-MCAR or G-
MAR. Mohan and Pearl [45] provide the rules which can be used to determine the missingness
mechanism in a given m-DAG18. Note that G-MAR is a stronger requirement than MAR19.
ii) Recoverability. This refers to the task of establishing whether – for a given m-DAG and given
target parameter – the latter can be estimated consistently from the observed data at all.
Step 4: This is achieved by expressing the target parameter under the intervention of no missing data,
e.g. as a counterfactual quantity that would have been observed if there had been no missing
data – and using the following conditions to evaluate if the desired target quantity can be
expressed as a function of the observed (incomplete) data:
a) Consistency as defined in Section 3.6. Since we intervene onC this equates to: if CY = 1, then
Y CY =1 = Y ; and similarly if CA = 1, then A
CA=1 = A and if CL2 = 1, then L
CL2=1
2 = L2.
20
17for example by using multiple imputation with a correctly specified imputation model
18briefly, if there is no arrow between C and {L, A, Y } the data are G-MCAR. If there is i) no arrow between any variable
in C and any variable in L2 and ii) no path like C← U → L1 the data are G-MAR.
19essentially MAR refers to a set conditional independencies and the number of conditional independence assumptions that
need to be verified is exponential in the number of missing variables, see Table 2 in Mohan and Pearl [45] for an example.
It may be difficult to practically argue for each of these dependency assumptions in a specific data example which is a
weakness of the classic MAR definition; nevertheless, MAR is still the weakest known condition under which the missingness
process can be ignored. Note that G-MAR and MAR are equivalent under the conditions of i) independent observations [as
considered in this manuscript] and ii) conditional independence of the different missingness indicators.
20it can be argued [44] that ‘intervening’ on censoring due to death violates this assumption.
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b) Positivity as defined in Section 3.5. If we intervene on C, this is the requirement that
P (C = 1|L1 = l1,L2CL2=1 = l2, ACA=1 = a, Y CY =1 = y) > 0 for ∀ l1, l2, a, y where we
require P (L1 = l1,L2
CL2=1 = l2, A
CA=1 = a, Y CY =1 = y) > 0.
c) Conditional independency assumptions as determined in Step 2. This is similar, yet not
identical, to the weaker conditional exchangeability assumption from Section 3.1.
d) Factorization of the joint distribution of the data.
If the target parameter is recoverable, use either existing results to obtain a suitable estimator
(for example, using complete cases) or derive it manually. Briefly, under (G-)MCAR a complete
case analysis is acceptable but not efficient; and under (G-)MAR existing methods (multiple
imputation, weighting) may yield a consistent estimator if used correctly. For both (G-)MNAR
and (G-)MAR estimands and estimators can be derived using i) the conditions a) - d); or ii)
using existing results in the literature for specific m-DAG’s [44]; or iii) by utilizing specific
theorems, for example Theorem 4 in Mohan and Pearl [45].
iii) Testability. This refers to the question whether it is possible to tell if any of the assumptions
encoded in the m-DAG is incompatible with the observed data. MAR and MNAR is known to be
untestable [46]. However, in any given data set it can be tested if G-MAR holds (Theorem 7 in
Mohan and Pearl [45]). Note that while G-MAR can be refuted, it can never be verified.
Step 5: If G-MAR is assumed, test if the assumption meets the observed data.
To better understand the above steps consider a simple example as depicted in the m-DAG in
Figure 7 (Step 1). The implied conditional independencies for the missingness indicators include21
CL2
∐
L2, Y |L1, A; CA
∐
A, Y |L1, L2; CY
∐
Y |L1, L2, A (Step 2).
A Y
L1
L2
CA
CL2
CY
Figure 7: Example of a m-DAG
The data are G-MNAR because there exist arrows between C variables and partially observed vari-
ables, for example L2 → CA (Step 3). Thus, existing results for classic MAR with respect to complete
case analyses or multiple imputation (or others) can not necessarily be well justified. In the regression
context, we are interested in the conditional expectation of Y given A and L (and how this is defined in
terms of regression coefficients). To establish whether the full conditional distribution can be recovered
we can use the conditions a) - d) from Step 4 to derive the following:
P (Y C=1|AC=1, LC=12 , L1) = P (Y C=1|AC=1, LC=12 , L1,C = 1)
= P (Y |A,L2, L1,C = 1)
The left-hand side states the target distribution under the intervention that there is no missing data,
i.e. that C is set to 1 for everyone. The first equality follows from the conditional independence as-
sumptions; the second from the assumption of consistency. Positivity is required because we want the
conditional distribution to be well-defined for all covariate strata. A factorization of the distribution
was not needed in the given example. The established result shows that a complete case analysis with
regression is valid and the missing-data mechanism allows us to estimate the desired target parameter.
21see Web Table 1 in Moreno-Betancur [44], Section 2.2 in Mohan and Pearl [45] and Section 3.13 on d-separation for more
details on how the conditional independencies are derived.
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Instead of deriving the above results, it would also have been possible to consult Moreno-Betancur et al.
[44] to verify that for the given m-DAG recoverability is achieved by a complete case analysis. Step 5 is
not needed here because G-MAR is not assumed.
In summary, if there is no missing data, then there is no problem. If there is missing data, and if
the missingness mechanism is indeed MCAR, fitting a regression model on the complete cases is valid22.
Under MAR established results regarding consistent estimation of regression parameters can be used [41],
for example using multiple imputation or sometimes complete case analyses; but if multiple variables are
missing, MAR can neither be justified well nor tested in the data. Thus, it may be better to state one’s
assumption about the missingness process in a m-DAG. Following the graphical framework of Mohan and
Pearl [45], namely transparency, recoverability and testability, one can establish whether the the desired
target quantity can be estimated or not; an if yes, how. Under (G-)MNAR the graph-based framework
offers to date the best approach to decide whether the question at hand can be answered or not.
Given the above considerations it follows that using regression models on incomplete data can lead
to bias in causal effect estimation, and whether this is the case, and how it can be addressed, can be
determined by making structural assumptions about the data-generating process.
3.12 Assumption 12: no relevant measurement error
Measurement error (ME), also known as mis-classification for categorical variables23, will often lead to
bias when estimating the causal effect of A on Y . Estimates of regression coefficients can either be
attenuated or strengthened by measurement error [47]. Similar to the former section a simple summary
about whether bias exists or not can be determined by evaluating back-door paths in DAGs and by taking
into account the process that leads to the measurement error.
Figure 8a shows a simple example of measurement error: there are no confounders, A is measured
accurately, but the measured outcome (Y ∗) does not correspond to the actual outcome. One may add
an unmeasured variable UY to the DAG to describe any factors (other than the actual outcome) that
influence the measured Y . In general there is no guarantee that, for example, the associational difference
E(Y |A∗ = 1) − E(Y |A∗ = 0) corresponds to the causal difference E(Y A=1) − E(Y A=0). It is however
possible to ignore measurement error in the outcome under specific assumptions: for instance, if Y |A
follows a normal distribution (i.e. a linear model is assumed) and one has classical measurement error
(CME), i.e. Y ∗i = Yi + υi, υi ∼ N(0, σ2υi). Since Y ∗i = Yi + υi, we have Y ∗i = Yi + β0 + β1Ai + i + υi,
i ∼ N(0, σ2i), and consistent estimates remain consistent, at least if  and υ are independent.
It is however unusual that such (or similar) simple assumptions would hold in many realistic settings.
The measurement error may also not be additive and caused by various measured and unmeasured vari-
ables. While ignoring measurement error often leads to bias with respect to the causal target quantity, it
makes still sense to evaluate the structure of the measurement error as for certain types of error, regression
estimates can be corrected if data or knowledge about the measurement error process is existent. Figure
8b gives an example of independent but differential measurement error. The ME is called independent
because UA and UY (which relate to the ME process of both Y and A) are independent given that the
path between them is blocked by the collider Y ∗; the ME is however differential because UA depends
on the outcome Y 24. Depending on whether the ME is dependent or independent, and differential or
non-differential, and depending which data is measured, it may be possible to correct for the bias of the
regression coefficients; see Buonaccorsi [48] and Carroll et al. [47] for details.
Confounders or colliders may be mis-measured too. Conditioning on colliders with measurement
error still leads to collider bias because the mismeasured variable is still a cause25 of both A and Y [9].
Whether ME in a confounder causes bias with respect to effect estimation depends on the respective
situation. In Figure 8c a mis-measured confounder causes bias because it does not block the back-door
path A ← L → Y . But in Figure 8d there is no problem in using the mis-measured variable because all
22however, at the expense of loss of information [41]
23non-compliance as described under assumption 9 can also be seen as measurement error because the measured treatment
A deviates from the assigned treatment A˜.
24if UY depends on A the ME is differential too.
25that is, a descendant in a DAG.
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A Y
Y ∗UY
(a) ME in Y – no
bias in linear model
with CME, but typi-
cally bias
UA UY
A∗ Y ∗
A Y
(b) ME in Y and A – ME
is differential, bias exists
L∗
L A Y
(c) ME in L – bias exists (open
back-door path)
L∗ A Y
L
(d) ME in L (HIV example) – no
bias (closed back-door path)
Figure 8: Examples for different measurement error mechanisms
back-door paths are blocked by conditioning on L∗. An example for a situation like in 8d is when HIV-
positive patients are assigned antiretroviral treatment (A) based on their measured laboratory values
(CD4 count, L∗); while the true underlying disease severity markers (L) influence both the measured
markers and the outcome (say death), the measured values will still be a strong marker to determine
mortality and conditioning on them will block the open back-door path.
In summary, measurement error will often lead to biased regression coefficients, except in either very
simple situations or situations where mis-measured variables act as a confounder that can block a back-
door path. If the structure (in/dependent; non-/differential) of the measurement error is known, it may
be possible to correct bias in regression coefficients.
3.13 Summary of all assumptions
The above introduced assumptions intersect with each other and it is possible to distill them into a smaller
set of assumptions. To do so, it is useful to understand the concept of d-separation. A set of variables S˜
is said to block, or d-separate, a path p if either
i) p contains a chain26 A→ L→ Y or a chain A← L→ Y such that L is in S˜ or
ii) p contains a chain A→ L← Y such that L is not in S˜, and no descendant of L either.
If S˜ blocks all paths from A to Y , then A and Y are independent conditional on S˜. The d-separation
definition implies that A and Y are conditionally independent given S if back-door paths between A and
Y are blocked, which can be achieved by conditioning on a confounder or non-conditioning on a collider.
At this point it is useful to also recall the back-door criterion[11], which states that a set S is sufficient for
causal effect identification if i) the elements of S block all back-door paths from A to Y (i.e. d-separate
A and Y and thus guarantee conditional exchangeability) and ii) S does not contain a descendant of
A. This theorem echoes much of the assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, and 1227 and thus the first crucial
assumption can be summarized as:
(AS1) : the set of variables S = L satisfies the back-door criterion .
26i.e. a sub-path of p
27assumption 12 also includes some more general considerations regarding selection bias and measurement error which are
not reflected in assumption (AS1).
16
Assumption 4 was the assumption of positivity and is particularly relevant during estimation (as
opposed to identification)28:
(AS2) : P (A = a|L = l) > 0 for ∀l with P (L = l) 6= 0.
Assumptions 6 and 7 relate to consistency and are, as discussed above, sometimes stated as a theorem
rather than an assumption [7]:
(AS3) : IfA = a, thenY a = Y for∀a .
Assumptions 8 and 9 directly target the definition of the target quantity (and aren’t necessary assumptions
for causal inference in general). We call them (AS4) and (AS5) here. For purpose of illustration of the
example below, we may define them in an over-simplified29 way as:
(AS4) : collapsibility; for example, that β1 = β
∗
1 for
E(Y |A = a, L = l) = β0 + β1a+ β2l and
E(Y |A = a) = β0 + β∗1a
even if L is not a confounder and is related only to Y and not A[28, 33, 50] .
(AS5) : no effect modification; for example, that
E(Y a|L = l1) = E(Y a|L = l0) .
To understand how these these assumptions are needed in a specific example, assume that the ATE
is the causal quantity of interest, and that all relationships of interest are linear and a linear model is the
regression model of interest, i.e. E(Y |A,L) = β0 + β1A+ β2AL+ β3L. The average treatment effect can
then be identified using the regression parameter β1 under assumptions (AS1)-(AS5) because
ATE = E(Y 1 − Y 0) = E(Y 1)− E(Y 0)
(AS1)
= E(Y 1|A = 1, L = l)− E(Y 0|A = 0, L = l)
(AS3)
= E(Y |A = 1, L = l)− E(Y |A = 0, L = l)
(AS2)
= β0 + β1 + β2l + β3l − β0 − β3l = β1 + β2l
(AS4,AS5)
= β1 .
The equalities follow directly from the above definitions. Positivity is required because the conditional
expectation E(Y |A = a, L = l) may not be well-defined under the model β0 + β1A + β2AL + β3L if the
model is not saturated and the stratum A = a, L = l is empty or sparse because of P (A = a|L = l) ≈ 0.
The last equality only holds if for all covariate strata L = l the same results are obtained; which implies
no effect modification and collapsibility. If there is no effect modification, there is still β1 6= β1 + β2l for
any l under non-collapsibility.
Thus, any consistent estimator βˆ1 of β1 consistently estimates the ATE. This means that using the
standard maximum likelihood estimator for β1 is appropriate (in this case, and under compliance, no
missing data and no measurement error); though using estimates conditional on a prior model selection
step, or many shrinkage estimation techniques, would be inappropriate [51, 52, 53].
4 Observational Data and Randomized Studies
Some of the assumptions outlined above can be met by design. It is useful to distinguish between
randomized studies (i.e. studies or experiments where intervention assignment is under control of an
28it may be possible to relax this assumption, see Greenland (2017) [6] for examples
29see Pearl (2009) [11] for a general definition of collapsibility and vander Weele (2012) [49] for effect modification
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experimenter) and observational studies (where intervention assignment is not necessarily under control
of someone).
For observational studies none of the assumptions can be expected to be met by design; and it may
thus be advisable to check them. However, for randomized studies the study design guarantees that some
assumptions are met. Table 3 gives a summary on the design-assumptions relationship.
Table 3: The checking of assumptions depending on study design
Randomized Studies Observational Studies
Assumption 1 X achieved by design ! needs to be verified
Assumption 2 (X) typically not relevant ! needs to be verified
Assumption 3 (!) needs to be verified sometimes ! needs to be verified
Assumption 4 ! needs to be verified ! needs to be verified
Assumption 5 X achieved by design ! needs to be verified
Assumption 6 (X) met, if well-designed ! needs to be verified
Assumption 7 (X) often not a problem ! needs to be verified
Assumption 8 (X) typically not relevant by design ! needs to be verified
Assumption 9 ! needs to be verified ! needs to be verified
Assumption 10 ! needs to be verified ! similar to assumption 12
Assumption 11 ! needs to be verified ! needs to be verified
Assumption 12 ! needs to be verified ! needs to be verified
First, a (completely) randomized experiment requires by definition that 0 < P (Ai = 1) < 1. Thus,
the assumption of positivity is always met. Another implication is that the treatment assignment process
does (trivially) not depend on potential outcomes; that is, P (Ai = 1|Y a) = P (Ai = 1) ∀A = a. This
requirement can also be framed as P (Y a = 1|A = 1) = P (Y a = 1|A = 0) = P (Y a = 1) which makes
it immediately clear that exchangeability (Y a
∐
A) is achieved by design. This implies that randomized
experiments don’t face the problem of unmeasured confounders (assumption 1). Stratified or paired
randomized experiments only guarantee conditional exchangeability, not exchangeability, which is however
sufficient for assumption 1 to be met [54].
Correct model specification (assumption 2) is usually not a problem for completely randomized studies,
either because covariate inclusion is not necessary to identify the causal effect or because hypothesis tests
are often still valid under model mis-specification [10]. Of course, if A is continuous and the dose-response
relationship between A and Y is of interest, model mis-specification of this relationship may still be a
concern.
In many randomized experiments, variables which are measured after the outcome (endpoint) are not
included in the analysis. Thus, the threat of conditioning on a collider (assumption 3) is often limited.
Nevertheless, in some situations collider bias could still be a problem, for example in time-to-event analyses
where a particular outcome is evaluated on a subset of survivors [55]. Mediators are post-intervention
variables which are not included in analyses in some fields [18]. However, reflecting on mediation (and
assumption 4) may still be desirable in many areas as variables measured between intervention assignment
and the outcome may be captured and potentially used in analyses.
A well-designed randomized experiment, with a clear study protocol, should typically not suffer from
violations of the consistency assumption. However, there might be situations in which violations could
occur: for example, if a surgical procedure was performed differently by different surgeons, then the
consistency assumption may be violated and there may be multiple versions of treatment – all with
different effects on the outcome. Many considerations regarding the consistency assumption also refer to
the SUTVA assumption; however, interference between study subjects may be a particular concern and
can be problematic in randomized studies: if interference itself is not the subject of interest, applying
standard regression approaches to estimate common treatment effects will yield invalid inference [56, 57].
As opposed to observational studies, effect modification is no concern at all for completely randomized
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experiments. As noted above, a completely randomized experiment does not only achieve conditional
exchangeability by design, but even exchangeability. Thus, P (Y a = 1|A = 1, L = l) = P (Y a = 1|A =
0, L = l) = P (Y a = 1) for a binary treatment and ∀L = l. In stratified or paired randomized experiments
effect modification could in principle prohibit marginal effect estimation with regression; however, in this
case there is only a limited set of strata one would condition on; and thus the change to conditional target
quantities would be less of a concern as in observational studies.
Collapsibility (assumption 9) is a relevant consideration for randomized studies. Using non-collapsible
effect measures, for example the conditional odds ratio estimated with logistic regression, can lead to
bias with respect to marginal target quantities. It follows that the gain in precision that may come with
inclusion of covariates L in regression models comes at the cost of bias in randomized studies.
Of course, compliance, missing data (drop out) and measurement error are relevant topics for ran-
domized experiments too, and assumptions 10-12 need to be checked. A more comprehensive discussion
follows in Section 6.2.
5 Illustration
To illustrate some relevant points that follow from the above sections, it makes sense to look at some simple
simulation settings. In total, seven simulation setups are considered. The data-generating mechanisms
are visualized in the DAGs from Figures 7 and 9. The exact model specifications are given in the code
from Appendix A.
L A Y
(a) DAG for setups 1,2 and 4a
L1 A Y L2
(b) DAG for setup 3
L A Y
(c) DAG for setups 4b and 5
A M Y
(d) DAG for setup 6
Figure 9: Directed acyclic graphs for simulation setups 1-6; setup 7 is based on Figure 7.
• Setup 1, reference setting with confounding: The first setting serves as a reference and contains a
binary intervention A, a continuous confounder L and a continuous outcome Y . The relationships
between these variables are very simple, see Appendix A for details. In this setup, a linear regression
model (containing the covariates A and L) is expected to give an unbiased effect estimate of the
average treatment effect.
• Setup 2, model mis-specification: The second setting is identical to the first – except that the L has
a non-linear influence on Y , but the regression model includes L linearly. Based on the reasoning
from Section 3.2, the effect estimate of A on Y should typically be biased if the model specification
(for example with respect to L) is incorrect.
• Setup 3, inclusion of a collider: The third setup is similar to the first two settings, but contains an
additional variable L2 which is a collider. Inclusion of both the collider and the confounder in the
regression model is expected to give biased estimates for the effect of A on Y .
• Setup 4, effect modification: The fourth setting is identical to the first, except that the effect of A
on Y varies with respect to L, i.e. there is effect modification. If the average treatment effect is
of interest, it is expected that a linear regression model without an interaction term yields biased
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effect estimates, whereas the inclusion of an interaction term prohibits the estimation of the marginal
target quantity. Setup 4b is based on randomized treatment assignment as illustrated in Figure 9c.
In this case, a regression model containing containing both A and L, but not the interaction thereof,
should lead to approximately unbiased effect estimates.
• Setup 5, collapsibility and conditioning on covariates in randomized experiments: The fifth setting
mimics a randomized experiment because treatment assignment is random and does not depend
on L, see Figure 9c and Appendix A. As opposed to the first four settings, a binary outcome is
generated. Given the considerations on collapsibility from Section 3.9 it follows that a logistic
regression model without inclusion of L should give an unbiased estimate of the marginal odds
ratio, whereas the inclusion of L in the regression model should yield biased estimates.
• Setup 6, conditioning on a mediator: This setting is based on Figure 9d. The outcome is normally
distributed and both M and A are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution (Appendix A). A linear
model excluding the mediator should give an unbiased effect estimate of the ATE, whereas the
inclusion of M in the regression model is expected to yield biased effect estimates.
• Setup 7, complete case analysis under a missing not at random setup: The data of this setting
are simulated based on the mechanism explained in Figure 7 and Section 3.11. In this scenario, a
complete case analysis should lead to unbiased effect estimates even though the data are missing
not at random.
The results of the simulation, based on 10.000 simulation runs and a sample size of n = 1000, are
visualized in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Estimated bias in the simulation study for the different scenarios
As expected, regression can successfully deal with simple confounding (Setup 1). However, if covari-
ates are included but their relationship with the outcome is mis-specified, bias occurs (Setup 2). Inclusion
of colliders into a regression model leads to bias too (Setup 3). If effect modification is present, this is
irrelevant under randomized treatment assignment (Setup 4b); however, under non-randomized treatment
assignment this leads to bias because marginal effect estimation is not possible. When using collapsible
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effect measures, such as the odds ratio, conditioning on covariates is harmful even in randomized exper-
iments (Setup 5). The results of Setup 6 show that conditioning on mediators can be harmful, whereas
Setup 7 illustrates that even under MNAR unbiased effect estimation with regression can be feasible
sometimes.
6 The Implications for Statistical Practice
Understanding the assumptions which are needed to interpret regression coefficients causally is a prereq-
uisite to understand the differences between different statistical tasks, and how they relate to practical
data analyses. A few important points which follow immediately from the above discussions center around
the appropriate use and interpretation of regression models, the practice of Monte-Carlo simulations and
variable inclusion. These points are discussed in the following sections.
6.1 Descriptive, Predictive and Explanatory (Causal) Models
The last decade has seen a number of works which suggest that models, including regression models,
should be classified according to the trichotomy “descriptive – predictive – causal” [58, 59]. The distinction
between descriptive and predictive models is sometimes vague, but the difference to models that aim to
estimate causal effects is much clearer. Essentially, descriptive and predictive models estimate quantities
that can be expressed in terms of summaries of the observed data distribution, whereas causal estimands
are defined in terms of the post-intervention distributions, possibly using counterfactual notation. More
precisely, regression estimands are often30 conditional expectations, such as ψFO = E(Y |A,L), which are
a summary of the observed (joint) data distribution FO; however, as explained in Section 2.2, estimands
that are of interest from a causal perspective are defined on (joint) post-intervention distributions, such
as EFP (Y
a).
While the estimands for descriptive and predictive questions can be defined based on the observed
data distributions, there may still be important differences in terms of estimation: for many descriptive
tasks unbiased or consistent estimation may be relevant31; for example, to estimate proportions of un-
employment or incidences of a disease, stratified by age and sex. Statistical prediction of new or future
observations32 can be guided by minimizing the prediction error between the estimated predictions and
the actual values. Many estimation techniques may reduce particular prediction errors, such as the mean
squared prediction error, by introducing bias in exchange for reduced variability: for example, shrinkage
estimation [61], model averaging techniques [62, 63] or variable selection based on (generalized) cross
validation33.
Regression models can be used for both description and prediction. The regression coefficients, and
their related standard errors, can for example be used to calculate conditional means E(Y |A,L), together
with 95% confidence intervals. They may serve as a purely descriptive summary of the data. If regression
models are used for prediction, estimated regression coefficients are part of a function that maps input
(covariates) to an output (outcome). However, they can not necessarily be interpreted without making
additional causal assumptions about the data generating mechanism. This follows immediately from
Section 3: covariates which are included to minimize a prediction error may be colliders or mediators,
which makes their respective coefficients not interpretable; consequently, the confidence intervals related
to these regression coefficients may have no meaning too. However, if one commits to a structural model
and the assumptions from Section 3 are met, then a regression coefficient can have a causal meaning and
may thus be of use for explanation of phenomena.
The practical implications of the above considerations are as follows:
30this is not always the case because some regression models target conditional densities, such as generalized additive
models of location, scale and shape [60]
31with the exception of data description using multivariate statistics, such as cluster analysis or principal component
analysis
32or the estimation of predictive distributions or regions
33the process of variable selection itself produces bias, see Section 6.4
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i) regression coefficients can only be used for explanation under a causal framework, which requires
commitment to a structural model, a target quantity, and evaluation of assumptions 1-12 as outlined
above.
ii) outside a causal framework regression models may be useful for prediction, but there is no guarantee
that regression coefficients and their associated confidence intervals have any (explanatory) meaning.
iii) for purely descriptive tasks, regression coefficients may be helpful to calculate conditional expectations
(or densities), but following the arguments from ii), the regression coefficients can not be used for
explanation, unless causal considerations are being taken into account.
6.2 Randomized Trials
The results and illustrations from Sections 3 and 5 have made it clear that non-collapsible effect measures
can cause problems even in randomized studies. Even in an idealized experiment, with full compliance,
no drop-out and no other problems, the inclusion of additional covariates in the regression models can
cause bias with respect to the marginal target quantity. For example, adjusting for variables other than
the intervention variable in logistic regression or survival models (such as the Cox proportional hazards
model) is incorrect when estimating treatment effects – unless the inclusion of these variables is meant to
evaluate a particular conditional target parameter, like under effect modification hypotheses.
The discussions of this paper have emphasized that the design of randomization alone does not guaran-
tee consistent or unbiased effect estimation under non-compliance, missing data and measurement error.
Non-compliance or non-adherence may be a particular concern in randomized trials: depending on the
process that determines non-compliance, using regression can yield biased effect estimates with respect
to the ATE and other common marginal effect measures. As discussed above, re-defining the estimand
may be an option in some cases; though accounting for non-adherence by measuring appropriate data
and using methods other than regression is the most viable option in most cases [64, 65].
Missing data, drop-out and loss to follow-up are not only common for observational data analyses, but
also for randomized trials. Both classic and modern results in the missing data literature point towards
the fact that neglecting missing data by analyzing the complete cases only will often, though not always,
lead to biased effect estimates when using regression and the data are not missing completely at random.
Using regression in conjunction with multiple imputation can facilitate consistent effect estimation under
assumptions, including a missing at random assumption. As pointed out in the literature, it is however
often difficult to defend this assumption when multiple variables are missing. To describe the (causal)
missingness process using m-DAGs, and establish identification results for regression estimators based
on this, may become more popular in future. A relevant consideration for randomized studies is that
censoring study participants due to drop-out may often be informative and the use of survival regression
models (without additional modifications or corrections) may not always be correct. Understanding the
reasons for missing data is thus certainly crucial in trials.
As discussed above, there are many more consequences for using regression in randomized trials:
measurement error will often lead to biased regression coefficients, except in either very simple situations
or situations where mis-measured variables act as a confounder that can block a back-door path. Moreover,
even collider bias can be an issue, for example when evaluating (secondary) outcomes on a subset of
survivors.
6.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations
Despite the fact that Monte-Carlo simulations are nowadays key to many statistical publications, guide-
lines and recommendations on best practice are rare, but exist [66]. A key point that is often overlooked
relates to the fact that any data-generating mechanism follows a natural time-ordering: variables are
typically not measured at exactly the same time point and observed data associations are the results of
an underlying causal data-generating mechanism. This is the case even for survey research: even when
two questions are asked shortly after each other, the mechanism that gives rise to the data (i.e. the
answers given) are based on attitudes and features that correspond to causal mechanisms; for example, a
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survey respondent may be asked about age, sex and agreement with a statement addressing discrimina-
tion. Simulating data for these variables would follow the natural order of sex, age and agreement with
the statement: first, because the response about the statement may be partly determined by age and sex;
and (observed) age may relate to sex because the sex distribution in a study population may affect the
age distribution as women have another life expectancy than men. Such a time-ordering is clearer for
other research areas, such as medicine when pre-treatment variables are followed by treatment and the
outcome respectively. It follows that simulation of data which does not resemble some sort of realistic
data-generating mechanism is meaningless because any real-world data analysis, upon which statistical
methods are employed, is based on such a mechanism. Interestingly, statistical simulations are often based
on data-generating mechanisms which are inappropriate. To better understand this, it is useful to com-
pare different practices. Suppose, we have a simple case of 3 variables. One can then distinguish at least
four different possibilities of simulating the data-generating process (DGP), all of which are commonly
employed in the literature to evaluate estimation strategies in regression models:
1. Drawing from 3 normal distributions, where A and L are drawn independently of each other:
1 # Simulated data assuming i) independence of variables and
2 # ii) no temporal order
3 # DGP not useful to evaluate causal/explanatory questions
4 L <- rnorm (1000 ,0 ,1)
5 A <- rnorm (1000 ,0 ,1)
6 Y <- rnorm (1000 ,2 - 3*L + 1*A,1)
This approach essentially assumes independence between A and L and no temporal ordering34.
Because of the latter it is not possible to evaluate post-intervention distributions, and therefore the
success of regression in terms of causal effect estimation.
2. Drawing from multivariate distributions:
1 # Simulated data assuming i) dependent variables ,
2 # ii) correlation via a multivariate normal distribution
3 # iii) no temporal order
4 # DGP not useful to evaluate causal/explanatory questions
5 library(mvtnorm)
6 sigma <- matrix(c(4,2,2,3), ncol =2)
7 LA <- rmvnorm(n=1000, mean=c(0,0), sigma=sigma) # matrix of L and A
8 Y <- rnorm (1000 ,2 - 3*LA[,1] + 1*LA[,2],1)
This approach assumes dependence between A and L and no temporal ordering. The dependence
structure is defined by, and restricted to, the multivariate normal distribution. As above, it is not
possible to evaluate post-intervention distributions, and therefore the success of regression in terms
of causal effect estimation.
3. Using copulas35 to model (possibly non-linear) dependencies between covariates:
1 # Simulated data assuming i) dependent variables ,
2 # ii) correlation via a Clayton copula
3 # iii) no temporal order
4 # DGP not useful to evaluate causal/explanatory questions
5 library(copula)
6 mycopula <- mvdc(claytonCopula (1, dim=2),c("norm","lnorm"),
7 list(list(mean =0.5, sd=1),list(meanlog =0.5, sdlog =0.5)))
8 LA <- rMvdc (1000, mycopula)
9 Y <- rnorm (1000 ,2 - 3*LA[,1] + 1*LA[,2],1)
34as written in the code box, one could speculate that L was drawn before A, but does not affect A – and that a time-
ordering is present. The first code box means to represent a case where this is not assumed however. The fourth box lists
the case where an ordering is assumed.
35see Yan (2007) [67] for details about the R-package copula
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This approach facilitates possibly complex dependence structures between A and L, and assumes
no temporal ordering. As above, it is not possible to evaluate post-intervention distributions, and
therefore the success of regression in terms of causal effect estimation.
4. Drawing from distributions according to a temporal order:
1 # Simulated data assuming i) dependent variables ,
2 # ii) correlation defined by structural relationships
3 # iii) temporal order
4 # DGP useful to evaluate causal/explanatory questions
5 L <- rnorm (1000 ,0 ,1)
6 A <- rnorm (1000 ,2*L,1)
7 Y <- rnorm (1000 ,2 + A + 3*L,1)
This approach can alternatively also be implemented using the R-package simcausal [68] which
allows technically simple evaluation of causal estimands. Appendix A gives thorough simulation
examples for the situations considered in Section 5.
The first three approaches explained above have in common that they don’t assume any temporal
ordering of the variables, or at least the covariates. Since the order is not clear, it is also not clear how
intervening on a variable would influence other variables. It is therefore not possible to determine a
post-intervention distribution and ultimately causal estimands.
The practical consequences are as follows: if methods of estimation for regression models are evaluated
in simulation settings, it is essential to distinguish for what they are being evaluated for: is it a descriptive,
predictive or explanatory (causal) question, see also Section 6.1. For descriptive and predictive questions,
data-generating processes similar to strategies 1-3 can be appropriate, particularly those that allow for a
(potentially complex) dependence structure between variables. In this case, it is particularly meaningful
to evaluate measures such as the mean squared predication error, or the bias – as those are the measures
that possibly address predictive and descriptive questions respectively. As argued above, when evaluating
estimation techniques for regression coefficients in the context of causal effect estimation, using a time-
ordered approach, such as outlined in strategy 4, is inevitable; otherwise, causal concepts such as bias
due to conditioning on colliders and mediators, are being neglected implicitly.
6.4 Variable Selection
Variable selection in regression models is a highly relevant topic in the contemporary statistical literature.
Selecting variables based on hypothesis testing, information criteria (Akaike’s information criteria and
variations thereof), predictive criteria such as (generalized) cross validation or the area under the curve
(AUC), Bayesian criteria, minimum description length and shrinkage estimation have been suggested [61,
69]. Common arguments to apply model selection relate to a good bias-variance tradeoff, to make a model
interpretable by dimension reduction and to find the most important “predictors” or “risk factors”. It is
true indeed that model selection often reduces prediction errors: this is essentially because the reduction of
included variables reduces variability, in exchange for bias that comes with any kind of model selection36.
Similar to the arguments of Section 6.1, one can conclude that variable selection in regression modeling
may be useful for predictive modeling, but the regression coefficients and their respective confidence
intervals may not necessarily have a meaning or interpretation: both because colliders or mediators are
potentially being selected by the respective model selection procedure and because regression estimates
are conditional on the selected model, which results in biased coefficients and over-optimistic confidence
intervals [70, 71, 72]. Of note, the latter point can’t always be fixed with post-model selection inference
procedures [52, 73, 74].
Variable selection to improve interpretability or to understand “risk factors” can only be utilized under
a causal framework: as argued above, regression coefficients are only guaranteed to have an explanatory
meaning under a causal framework with a clear commitment to a structural causal model, a target
quantity and verification and discussion of assumptions 1-12. In this case, variable selection should be
36may it be intended, as for shrinkage estimators such as the LASSO or model averaging techniques[62], or as a byproduct
of model selection in general [70]
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solely guided by Pearl’s back-door criterion, i.e. inclusion of variables that block back-door paths from
the intervention to the outcome and are non-descendants on the intervention.
The ultimate conclusion of these reflections is that it is typically not possible to have one regression
model to answer multiple different questions, i.e. to evaluate different treatment effects, make good
predictions and describe populations; ideally there is one model per research question, substantiated by
structural knowledge if the aim is causal in nature.
7 Conclusion
This article has highlighted that causal inference with regression modeling is possible, but requires many
assumptions to be fulfilled. Many of these assumptions relate directly to the back-door criterion, which
requires the inclusion of those variables which close all back-door paths from the intervention to the
outcome and no conditioning on descendants of the intervention variable37. Additional assumptions,
which are not necessarily needed for causal identification in general, but are relevant when estimating
and causally interpreting regression models in particular data analyses are consistency (well-defined in-
terventions, non-interference), positivity and considerations regarding the marginal nature of most causal
estimands (non-collapsibility, effect modification). Moreover, assumptions regarding the missing data
mechanism, measurement error and compliance need to be fulfilled.
It is important to stress that some, though not all of these assumptions can be violated even in
randomized studies. Using regression in the context of non-collapsible effect measures is a threat which
may be less well-known, but potentially problematic in many settings. Also non-compliance with treat-
ment assignment and missing data due to drop out are important considerations that need attention and
discussion as described in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
Reflecting on the implications that causal considerations have on estimating and interpreting regression
models are manifold: first, without committing to a structural (causal) model and a target quantity, it
is impossible to assign any explanatory meaning to a regression coefficient. It follows that the use of a
causal framework is indispensable when using regression, unless the scientific question of interest is purely
predictive or descriptive. In this case however, there is no guarantee that regression coefficients and their
respective confidence intervals have any explanatory meaning (because inclusion of colliders, mediators,
incorrect model specification or collapsibility issues may potentially produce estimates that are different
in size or sign compared to the [marginal] target quantity of interest); regression coefficients are then
either part of a function that maps an input to an output, or a parameter that defines a conditional
expectation. This should be taken into account in statistical practice. Second, and related to this point:
data-driven model selection can then only be meaningful for predictive tasks; in which case regression
coefficients should not necessarily be interpreted (causally) – see also Section 6.4. Variable inclusion for
explanatory questions should be solely guided by the back-door theorem.
Third, as argued above, mechanisms that produce data are naturally causal in the sense that a natural
time-ordering and physical laws are the basis of all measurable data. Monte-Carlo simulations which
don’t take a natural time-ordering into account are often blind to causal concepts related to colliders or
mediators; thus, if estimators for regression models are being evaluated by means of simulations, their
intended meaning (causal, prediction, description) should be clarified; and if the potential application is
explanatory in nature only appropriate data-generating mechanisms, es explained in Section 6.3, should
be used.
Many of the limitations of regression modeling for causal effect estimation can be overcome with
competing methods: for example, any issues of conditional versus marginal estimation can be completely
avoided by using g-methods, i.e. inverse probability of treatment weighting, g-computation or g-estimation
of structural nested models [9, 75]. Those methods are sometimes also a good starting point to address
issues around non-compliance, missing data and measurement error. To avoid the threat of model mis-
specification, it has been suggested to use data adaptive estimation, such as ensemble learning. Doubly
robust estimation techniques like targeted maximum likelihood estimation, which require models for both
37of note, the latter point is not equivalent to the rule of not conditioning on any post-treatment variable because post-
treatment variables may not necessarily be descendants of the intervention, see particularly Section 3.4 and Figure 5b
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the outcome and treatment assignment process, allow the incorporation of data-adaptive estimation while
retaining valid inference [20, 23]. Moreover, flexible and data-adaptive modeling approaches are vital to
address practical positivity violations by extrapolating into sparse data regions [3, 16].
This manuscript did not embark upon simultaneous interventions [76] and longitudinal causal data
analyses [9, 75], including multiple time point interventions. However, most relevant points discussed
above would also apply in this setting. Moreover, if there are (time-dependent) confounders which are
affected by prior interventions, regression estimates becomes invalid anyway [9].
In summary, regression modeling can be used for causal effect estimation, but it requires many as-
sumptions to be met and practical challenges to be faced, some of which can be avoided using alternative
methodological approaches.
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A R-Code of the Simulation studies
1 ####################
2 # 0) Load Packages #
3 ####################
4
5 library(simcausal) # causal data simulation
6 library(doParallel) # for parallelization
7
8
9 #################################
10 # 1) Data -Generating Processes #
11 #################################
12
13 # a) simple reference setting
14 M <- DAG.empty()
15 M <- M +
16 node("L",
17 distr = "rnorm",
18 mean=1, sd=1) +
19 node("A",
20 distr = "rbern",
21 prob = plogis (-0.5 + 2*L)) +
22 node("Y",
23 distr = "rnorm",
24 mean= 2 + A + 3*L)
25 Mset <- set.DAG(M) # setup 1
26 true1 <- 1 # true effect for A
27
28 # b) setup for incorrect model specification
29 M2 <- DAG.empty()
30 M2 <- M2 +
31 node("L",
32 distr = "rnorm",
33 mean=1, sd=1) +
34 node("A",
35 distr = "rbern",
36 prob = plogis (-0.5 + 2*L )) +
37 node("Y",
38 distr = "rnorm",
39 mean= 2 + A + 0.5*L^2)
40 Mset2 <- set.DAG(M2) # setup 2
41 true2 <- 1 # true effect for A
42
43 # c) setup for collider bias
44 M3 <- DAG.empty()
45 M3 <- M3 +
46 node("L",
47 distr = "rnorm",
48 mean=1, sd=1) +
49 node("A",
50 distr = "rbern",
51 prob = plogis (-0.5 + 2*L)) +
52 node("Y",
53 distr = "rnorm",
54 mean= 2 + A + 3*L) +
55 node("L2", # L2 = collider
56 distr = "rnorm",
57 mean=Y*A, sd=1)
58 Mset3 <- set.DAG(M3) # setup 3
59 true3 <- 1 # true effect for A
60
61
62 # d) effect modification
63 M4 <- DAG.empty()
29
64 M4 <- M4 +
65 node("L",
66 distr = "rnorm",
67 mean=1, sd=1) +
68 node("A",
69 distr = "rbern",
70 prob = plogis (-0.5 + 2*L)) +
71 node("Y",
72 distr = "rnorm",
73 mean= 2 + A + 3*L + A*L)
74 Mset4 <- set.DAG(M4) # setup 4
75 # true marginal ATE
76 a4.1 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob = 1) # set A=1 and A=0 (intervene)
77 a4.0 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob = 0)
78 # post -intervention DAG
79 Mset4 <- Mset4 + action("a4.0", nodes = a4.0) + action("a4.1", nodes = a4.1)
80 int.dat4 <- simcausal ::sim(DAG = Mset4 , actions = c("a4.1", "a4.0"), n = 1000000 ,
rndseed = 345)
81 Mset4 <- set.targetE(Mset4 , outcome = "Y", param = "a4.1-a4.0")
82 true4 <- eval.target(Mset4 , data = int.dat4)$res # true effect (ATE) for A
83
84 # as d); but with randomized treatment assignment
85 M4b <- DAG.empty()
86 M4b <- M4b +
87 node("L",
88 distr = "rnorm",
89 mean=1, sd=1) +
90 node("A", # random treatment assignment
91 distr = "rbern",
92 prob = plogis (-0.5)) +
93 node("Y",
94 distr = "rnorm",
95 mean= 2 + A + 3*L + A*L)
96 Mset4b <- set.DAG(M4b) # setup 4
97 # true marginal ATE
98 Mset4b <- Mset4b + action("a4.0", nodes = a4.0) + action("a4.1", nodes = a4.1)
99 int.dat4b <- simcausal ::sim(DAG = Mset4b , actions = c("a4.1", "a4.0"),
100 n = 1000000 , rndseed = 345)
101 Mset4b <- set.targetE(Mset4b , outcome = "Y", param = "a4.1-a4.0")
102 true4b <- eval.target(Mset4b , data = int.dat4b)$res # true effect for A
103
104 # e) collapsibility
105 M5 <- DAG.empty()
106 M5 <- M5 +
107 node("L",
108 distr = "rnorm",
109 mean=1, sd=1) +
110 node("A",
111 distr = "rbern",
112 prob = 0.5) + # randomized experiment
113 node("Y", # binary outcome
114 distr = "rbern",
115 prob = plogis(A+L))
116 Mset5 <- set.DAG(M5) # setup 5
117 # true marginal effects
118 a5.1 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob = 1); a5.0 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob =
0) # set A=1 and A=0 (intervene)
119 Mset5 <- Mset5 + action("a5.0", nodes = a5.0) + action("a5.1", nodes = a5.1)
120 int.dat5 <- simcausal ::sim(DAG = Mset5 , actions = c("a5.1", "a5.0"), n = 1000000 ,
rndseed = 345)
121 Mset5 <- set.targetE(Mset5 , outcome = "Y", param = "a5.1"); true5.1 <- eval.target
(Mset5 , data = int.dat5)$res # P(Y(had A=1)=1)
122 Mset5 <- set.targetE(Mset5 , outcome = "Y", param = "a5.0"); true5.2 <- eval.target
(Mset5 , data = int.dat5)$res # P(Y(had A=0)=1)
123 true5_ATE <- true5.1-true5.2 # true ATE
30
124 true5_OR <- ((true5 .1)/(1-true5 .1))/(( true5 .2)/(1-true5 .2)) # true MOR
125 true5_logOR <- log((( true5 .1)/(1-true5 .1))/(( true5 .2)/(1-true5 .2))) # true log MOR
126
127 # f) mediation
128 M6 <- DAG.empty()
129 M6 <- M6 +
130 node("A",
131 distr = "rbern",
132 prob = plogis (-0.5)) +
133 node("M", # M = mediator
134 distr = "rbern",
135 prob = plogis (0.5 - 2*A)) +
136 node("Y",
137 distr = "rnorm",
138 mean= 2 + M + A)
139 Mset6 <- set.DAG(M6) # setup 6
140 # true marginal effect estimates
141 a6.1 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob = 1)
142 a6.0 <- node("A", distr = "rbern", prob = 0)
143 Mset6 <- Mset6 + action("a6.0", nodes = a6.0) + action("a6.1", nodes = a6.1)
144 int.dat6 <- simcausal ::sim(DAG = Mset6 , actions = c("a6.1", "a6.0"), n = 1000000 ,
rndseed = 345)
145 Mset6 <- set.targetE(Mset6 , outcome = "Y", param = "a6.1-a6.0")
146 true6 <- eval.target(Mset6 , data = int.dat6)$res # true ATE
147
148 # g)
149 M7 <- DAG.empty()
150 M7 <- M7 +
151 node("L1",
152 distr = "rnorm",
153 mean=1, sd=1) +
154 node("L2",
155 distr = "rnorm",
156 mean=-1, sd=1) +
157 node("A",
158 distr = "rbern",
159 prob = plogis (-0.5 + 2*L1 + L2)) +
160 node("CA", # Prob. that A is missing
161 distr = "rbern",
162 prob = plogis (1.5+0.5*L1 + 0.5*L2)) +
163 node("CL2", # Prob. that L2 is missing
164 distr = "rbern",
165 prob = plogis (1.5 -0.75*L1 + 0.75*A)) +
166 node("Y",
167 distr = "rnorm",
168 mean= 2 + A) +
169 node("CY", # Prob. that Y is missing
170 distr = "rbern",
171 prob = plogis (1.5+0.25*L1 + 0.25*L2 + 0.5*A))
172 Mset7 <- set.DAG(M7) # setup 7
173 true7 <- 1 # true ATE
174
175 ####################
176 # 2) simulation #
177 ####################
178
179 runs <- 10000 # number of simulation runs
180 N <- 1000 # sample size
181
182 # Simulation loop
183 cl <- makeCluster(max(detectCores () -1,1)) # use all cores of computer , minus 1
184 registerDoParallel(cl) # start parallelization
185
186 sim <- foreach(r = 1:runs , .combine=rbind , .packages="simcausal") %dopar% {
187
31
188 # draw data
189 simdat <- sim(DAG = Mset , n = N, verbose=F)
190 simdat2 <- sim(DAG = Mset2 , n = N, verbose=F)
191 simdat3 <- sim(DAG = Mset3 , n = N, verbose=F)
192 simdat4 <- sim(DAG = Mset4 , n = N, verbose=F)
193 simdat4b <- sim(DAG = Mset4b , n = N, verbose=F)
194 simdat5 <- sim(DAG = Mset5 , n = N, verbose=F)
195 simdat6 <- sim(DAG = Mset6 , n = N, verbose=F)
196 simdat7 <- sim(DAG = Mset7 , n = N, verbose=F)
197 # models for the different setups
198 m1 <- lm(Y~A+L,data=simdat)
199 m2 <- lm(Y~A+L,data=simdat2)
200 m3 <- lm(Y~A+L+L2,data=simdat3)
201 m4 <- lm(Y~A+L,data=simdat4)
202 m4b <- lm(Y~A+L,data=simdat4b)
203 m5 <- glm(Y~A+L,data=simdat5 ,family=binomial)
204 m5.2 <- glm(Y~A,data=simdat5 ,family=binomial)
205 m6 <- lm(Y~A+M,data=simdat6)
206 m6.2 <- lm(Y~A,data=simdat6)
207 m7 <- lm(Y~A+L1+L2,
208 data=simdat7[simdat7$CY==1 & simdat7$CA==1 & simdat7$CL2 ==1 ,])
209 # store treatment estimates
210 results <- c(coef(m1)[2], coef(m2)[2], coef(m3)[2], coef(m4)[2], coef(m4b)[2],
211 coef(m5)[2], coef(m5.2)[2], coef(m6)[2], coef(m6.2)[2],coef(m7)[2])
212 }
213
214 stopCluster(cl) # stop parallelization
215
216 #########################
217 # 3) Evaluating Results #
218 #########################
219
220 # Bias
221 truth <- c(true1 ,true2 ,true3 ,true4 ,true4b ,true5_logOR ,true5_logOR ,true6 ,true6 ,true7)
222 BIAS <- apply(sim ,2,mean)-truth
223 names(BIAS) <- c("ATE , setup 1:\n simple \n","ATE , setup 2:\n incorrect MS \n",
224 "ATE , setup 3:\n collider \n structure \n",
225 "ATE , setup 4:\n effect \n modification \n (no random .) \n",
226 "ATE , setup 4b:\n effect \n modification \n (random .)\n",
227 "MOR , setup 5:\n collapsibility , \n condititional \n",
228 "MOR , setup 5:\n collapsibility , \n crude \n",
229 "ATE , setup 6:\n mediation ,\n conditional \n",
230 "ATE , setup 6:\n mediation ,\n crude \n",
231 "ATE , setup 7:\n MNAR+CC \n \n")
232 BIAS
233
234 # Visualize Bias
235 library(ggplot2)
236 Bias_data <- as.data.frame(matrix(NA, nrow=length(BIAS),ncol =2))
237 Bias_data[,1] <- BIAS
238 Bias_data[,2] <- names(BIAS)
239 colnames(Bias_data) <- c("Bias","Setup")
240
241 pdf(file=paste(getwd(),"/BIAS.pdf",sep=""), width =12)
242 ggplot(as.data.frame(Bias_data), aes(x=Setup ,y=Bias ,size=I(2.5))) + geom_point () +
243 theme_bw() +
244 scale_x_discrete("Simulation Setup") +
245 scale_y_continuous("Bias", breaks=seq(-1,1,0.25)) +
246 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(size =12), axis.text.x = element_text(size =12),axis.
title.y = element_text(size=12, angle = 90), axis.text.y = element_text(size =12))+
247 geom_vline(aes(xintercept = 8.5), size = .25, linetype = "dashed") +
248 geom_hline(aes(yintercept = 0)) +
249 annotate("text", x = 1.5, y = 0.75, label = "Bias with respect to ATE") +
250 annotate("text", x = 9.5, y = 0.75, label = "Bias with respect to log MOR")+
251 annotate("rect", xmin = 0.5, xmax = 2.5, ymin = 0.7, ymax = 0.8, alpha = .2) +
32
252 annotate("rect", xmin = 8.6, xmax = 10.4, ymin = 0.7, ymax = 0.8, alpha = .2)
253 dev.off()
33
